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Abstract
This paper proposes a fair electronic gambling scheme
for the Internet. The proposed scheme provides a unique
link between payment and gambling outcome so that the
winner can be ensured to get the payment. Since an optimal fair exchange method is used in gambling message
exchange, the proposed system guarantees that no one can
successfully cheat during a gambling process. Our system
requires an off-line Trusted Third Party (TTP). If a cheating occurs, the TTP can resolve the problem and make the
gambling process fair.

1. Introduction
With the growth of popularity of the Internet, the Internet
has become an important marketplace for on-line gambling.
There are numerous on-line gambling and casino web sites
on the Internet. For on-line gambling to be “successful”
several issues of security need to be properly addressed.
These include fairness of gaming transactions, security of
payment and other details, privacy of players, trustworthiness of the playing authorities and the ability to resolve disputes. Many of existing on-line casino games provide some
level of security and privacy. However, fairness is entirely
based on the trust of the casino/dealer.
We are interested in the situations where the on-line
casino is not necessarily trusted. That is, we have “untrusted” gaming sites. This is particularly important in practice as in many countries on-line gambling is not regulated
by government authorities. In such cases, for instance, there
may not be any guarantee that the casino authorities are not
having an unfair advantage over the players. In such circumstances, at least as far as the playing of the game is
concerned, it is necessary to have fair exchange schemes.
A fair exchange scheme [1, 2, 3, 4] requires a trusted third
party (TTP) who helps to resolve disputes amongst the playing entities. In general, the TTP can be on-line or off-line.

For efficiency reasons, it is preferable that TTP is off-line.
In this case, the TTP only comes into play when a problem
occurs in the gambling system; otherwise, TTP is not contacted. In this paper, we consider a gambling scheme where
there are players and a dealer. Normally in gambling systems, a player has to bet or pay money in advance before he
or she can play the game. We will assume this in our games.
The fair exchange scheme we propose resolves the following disputes: (1) the dealer refuses to make a payment to
the player who has won, (2) the dealer denies a payment
that was made by a player in advance, and (3) the player,
who payed to the dealer in advance, refuses to accept the
gambling outcome after he or she has lost.
An on-line gambling scheme must be associated with an
on-line payment scheme. Credit-based payment methods
[5] have been popular in on-line gambling casinos. The
payment scheme used in our system is based on a secure
electronic credit system that is similar to 3KP [6] or SET
[7].
Our contributions in this paper are twofold. First involves the proposal of a fair exchange scheme for on-line
gambling transactions. Second a secure linking of the online gambling with payment. Hence the overall scheme we
propose provides a unique link between a gambling process and its associated payment and which makes the whole
transaction process fair.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
2, we review the methods of equality proof of knowledge
([8], [9]) and proof of equivalence of discrete logarithm to
discrete log-logarithm [10]. These methods will be used in
the rest of the paper for our fair and secure on-line gambling
scheme. In section 3, we propose general fair exchange with
credit based payment and describe the details of the fair exchange protocol. In section 4, we first discuss the general
characteristics of on-line gambling and then develop a secure protocol for on-line “luck based” games. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper with some final remarks.

2. Preliminaries

3. General Fair Exchange with Credit Based
Payment

2.1. Equality proof of knowledge
The scheme of equality proof of knowledge was initially proposed by Chaum and Pedersen [8] and Verheul
and Tilborg [9]. The scheme is about proving knowledge
of something without revealing anything about its content.
The public information includes a prime number p and a
generator gi 2 Zp , i = 1; 2;    ; l, where l is the confidence level. In order to prove x, the prover chooses r 2 Zp
and computes

ai = gir mod p;
hi = gix mod p:

Challenges c and z are calculated as follows

c = H (g1 jjg2jj   jjgl jja1jja2jj   jjaljjh1jjh2jj   jjhl );
z = cx + r mod p:

The verifier will check the following equation to prove the
knowledge

giz =? hci ai mod p.
For all i, giz = hciai mod p indicatess that the prover has

the knowledge; otherwise, he does not.

2.2

Proof of equivalence of discrete logarithm to
discrete log-logarithm (PEDLDLL)

PEDLDLL was initially proposed by Stadler [10]. For
two given primes p and q (where p = 2q + 1), let x; y; z 2
Zq and X; Y 2 Zp . There exists an 2 f1; 2;    q ; 2g
such that y = x mod q and Y = X z mod p. Without revealing and z , a prover, who knows , can generate a certificate to prove that y = x mod q and Y =
X z mod p.
If the confidence level is l, for i = 1; 2;    ; l, the prover
chooses wi 2 f1; 2;    ; q ; 2g and computes t(xi ) =
xwi mod q, t(Xi ) = X zwi mod p. Then he could get

c = Hl (xjjyjjz jjX jjY jjt(x1)jjt(X1)jj   jjt(xl)jjt(Xl )).
For every bit c = c1 c2    cl , the prover computes R =
(r1; r2;    ; rl ), where ri = wi ; ci mod q ; 1. The certificate is given by (R; c).
During certificate verification, the verifier will check
whether

c = Hl (xjjyjjz jjX jjY jju1jjU1jj   jjuljjUl )
where ui = xri yci mod q and
( zri
X r mod p if ci = 0
Ui =
Y z i mod p if ci = 1

The fair exchange scheme proposed in this paper is based
on credit payment scheme discussed in [5]. We assume that
the bank and a TTP (trusted third party) are off-line. We
will also assume that the credit information of the client is
anonymous with non-interactive equality proof.
The following notations are used in the description of the
fair exchange scheme:













P KX : Public key of user X.
skx: Private key of user X.
C : Client with public key PKC and private key skc
M : Merchant with public key PKM and private key
skm
T T P : TTP with public key PKT and private key skt
B : Bank with public key P KB and private key skb.
tp : Timestamp generated by party P .
<    >skx: Signature with secret key skx.
Penc(P KX; M ): Encryption of message M with public key PKX .
Pdec (skx; Cipher): Decryption of ciphertext C with
private key skx.
H (M ): Hash function on message M .

3.1. System setup
The credit token is of the form

C = < C; l; h1; h2;    ; hl ; E; A >skb
The credit token contains the client’s identity C , the confidence level l, the expiry date E , maximum credit amount
A and hi = gix mod p, where gi 2 Zp are common generators for i = 1; 2;    ; l, where x is the concatenation of PIN
number, credit card number and salt. The credit token is
signed by the bank using its private key skb. The payment
slip token has the form

S = C ; M; O; $; tc; H (C ; M; O; $; tc),
where M is ID of merchant, O is the order, $ is the amount
of money and currency type and tc is the timestamp generated by the client C. The payment slip is signed by the client
with private key skc.
The encrypted payment slip token is

CS = Penc(PKT; < S >skc).

CS Cert is the token to prove CS is a ciphertext of S without disclosing the signature. Let us consider the construction of the token C S Cert. Let p and q be prime numbers
of the form p = 2q + 1. We will assume that q ; 1 has
no small prime factors except 2. We will use ElGamal system for encryption and decryption by TTP. ElGamal system has g a generator selected from Zq , where q is a prime
number. skt 2 f1; 2;    ; q ; 2g is the private key and
P KT = gskt mod q is the public key.
For encryption of message m, we have the following:
Penc(PKT; m) = (W; V ) mod q,
where W = gw and V = m(PKT )w , w 2 f1; 2;    ; q ;
2g is a randomly chosen number.
The signature scheme works as follows: Choose a random k 2 Zq , the signature has the form

< S >skc  (r; s)
where r = Gk mod p and s = k;1(H (S )+r skc) mod q
and PKC = Gskc mod p.
Encrypting the above signature s with PKT , we have,
Penc(PKT; s) = (W; V ). The encrypted payment slip
with signature is then given as follows:

CS = fr; W; V g;
where W = gw mod q, V = s(PKT )w mod q.
With transformation x = g, y = W ;1 mod q, z =
PKT , X = rV mod p, Y = GH (S ) (PKC )r mod p and
= ;w, choose wi 2 f1; 2;    ; q ; 2g, then

t(xi ) = xwi

mod q, t(Xi ) = X z

wi

mod

p

and

c = Hl (xjjyjjz jjX jjY jjt(x1)jjt(X1)jj   jjt(xl)jjt(Xl ))
c = c1 c2    cl
ri = wi ; ci mod q ; 1
(R; c) is the certificate CS Cert for CS .
The process of verification is to check,

c = Hl ((xjjyjjz jjX jjY jju1jjU1 jj   jjuljjUl )
where ui = xri yci mod q, and

Ui =

(

X zrri
Yz i

mod
mod

p if ci = 0
p if ci = 1

3.2. Fair-exchange protocol
The following is the fair-exchange protocol,

FAIR -E XCHANGE P ROTOCOL
Merchant

1: <offer>skm

Client

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;!
2: Pencr (PKM; (C; M; O; $; tc )); CS ; CS Cert
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;
3: Pencr (PKC; <offer>skm )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
!
4: Pencr (PKM; <S>skc )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;

The above protocol is totally fair. If both the client and
the merchant perform properly, the TTP will not be involved in the protocol. In Step 1, the merchant sends
his signed offer to the client. In Step 2, the client sends
Pencr (PKM; (C; M; O; $; tc)); CS ; CS Cert to the merchant, the merchant (1) checks credit information with
equality proof of knowledge; (2) uses C S Cert to check
CS is the ciphertext of the payment slip S signed by the
client. If the client performs improperly, the merchant
can detect it and stop the protocol. In step 3, the merchant sends Pencr (PKC; < offer >skm ) to the client.
If the merchant performs improperly in step 3, the client
can check the offer and stop the protocol. In step 4, the
client sends Pencr (P KM; < S >skc ) to the merchant. If
the merchant can not get the payment, he would bring his
Pencr (PKC; (offer)skm ) and CS , CS Cert to TTP. TTP
opens CS and sends the payment to the merchant, meanwhile sends the Pencr (PKC; (offer)skm ) to the client.

4. Fair On-line Gambling

There are different kinds of on-line gambling in the real
world, but there are some general characteristics for all
gambling systems. In this paper, we only consider the
credit-based payment. The following are important characteristics of on-line gambling:
a) Two-way payments involved.
— Anonymous.
— Credit Card Payment.
b) Bank is off-line.
c) Trusted Third Party is off-line.
d) Cheating is prevented during whole process.
— Information must be checked.
— If there is a dispute, TTP will reslove it.
In the following, we will discuss games from authorized
organizations and pure luck games respectively.

4.1. Games from authorized organizations

(a) Client gives his option

In this section, we assume that games are from authorized organizations. The most important assumption with
on-line casino is that it should not be trusted. Both Client
and Dealer must keep some secrets of their choice before
they have given their bets. We have developed the protocol
as follows:
P ROTOCOL

OF

G AMBLING

FROM

Client

Dealer

2: Pencr (PKC; M1 ); <H (M1 )>skd
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;
3: Pencr (PKD; CStatus); <H (CStatus)>skc; CSC ; CSC Cert
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
!

DStatus); <H (DStatus)>skd; CSD ; CSD Cert

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
5: Pencr (PKD;

options); <H (options)>skc

;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;!
Gid ; result); fIf client wins; Pencr (PKC; CSD )g
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
;

6: Pencr (PKC;

7: Pencr (PKC; CSC )
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
!

1. Client chooses a game and sends the message to Dealer

M0 = (GName; C; trc )
where GName is the name of the game to play,
the client ID, trc is timestamp for the message.

For Dealer, Client’s option is secret until it is necessary to make it public. Client’s
< option >skc is encrypted with TTP’s public
key PKT and has the signature of Client. If necessary, TTP can open it.
(b) Client prepares payment slip

AUTHORITY

1: Pencr (PKD; M0 ); <H (M0 )>skc
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;
!

4: Pencr (PKC;

GStatus = C; M0 ; M1 ;
Pencr (PKT; < option >skc )

C is

2. Dealer prepares the game for the client

M1 = (Game; Pencr (PKT;
< Gnmae; GID >skd ); tgc)
is the executable program. GID is the default parameter for the game to run, tgc is the timestamp for the preparation of the game. For the client,
GID is the secret until the end of the game. <
Gnmae; GID >skd is encrypted with TTP’s public
key PKT . If something is wrong, TTP can decrypt it
and get the GID .

Game

3. Client runs the game, gives his option and prepares his
payment slip for betting.

SC =< CStatus >skc
CStatus = (GStatus; CC ; D; $AC; tcbc)
where CC is the credit information of Client, D is
dealer identification, $AC is quantity of money, and
tcbc is timestamp.
Encrypted Payment slip:

CSC = Pencr (PKT; SC ).
The payment slip CSC contains the information of
game status, information of credit and information of
betting. With techniques of PEDLDLL discussed
in the second section of this paper, CSC Cert could
be constructed for checking that CSC is the encrypted
payment slip.
4. Dealer prepares his payment slip based on client’s betting,

SD =< DStatus >skd
DStatus = (CStatus; CD ; $AD; tdbc)
where CD: credit information of Dealer; $AD:
quantity of money; tdb c: timestamp.
Encrypted payment slip:

CSD = Pencr (P KT; SD )
The payment slip CSD contains the current information of game status, credit and betting. With techniques
of PEDLDLL, CSD Cert is constructed for ckecking
that CSD is the encrypted payment slip.
5. Client sends his option to Dealer by message

Pencr (PKD; option); < H (option) >skc
The message is encrypted with Dealer’s public key
P KD. Dealer can read the message and know Client’s
option. Based on Client’s options and G ID , Dealer can
get the result of the game.

6. Dealer
sends
Client
token
Pencr (PKC; GID ; result), the Client can get
GID . At this time, Client knows both the G ID
and his option, he can run the game and get the
result. If Client wins, Dealer also sends Client token
Pencr (PKC; CSD ), Client gets the payment slip
CSD .

7. If

Dealer

wins,

Pencr (PKC; CSC )
slip CSC ).

Client
sends
Dealer
and Dealer gets payment

Whole process of the gambling and payment is fair in the
above protocol. Before step 5, both the Dealer and Client
can not get the result of the game. Dealer has GID as secret, Client has options as secret. Both of them encrypt
their secrets with TTP’s public key at first. They make their
secrets public in step 5 and step 6. If the loser refuses to
pay, the winner can bring encrypted payment slip CSC and
CSD to TTP. TTP can then open them and check the result
of game. CSC contains the information of Client’s betting.
CSD contains the information of Dealer’s betting. Both of
them are necessary for the TTP to check the betting process
and result. Based on checking result, TTP can forward SC
to Dealer if Dealer wins. Forward SD to Client if Client
wins. The whole process is fair for both Client and Dealer.
Before Client has sent his CSC , Client has the right to
quit the protocol. Before Dealer sends his CSD , Dealer has
the right to quit the protocol. In above cases, both of them
have no peer’s encrypted payment slip, so they can not get
any payment or useful information of the game. the protocol
is aborted but the process is fair. If one party has peer’s
encrypted payment slip, he can bring both CSC and CSD to
TTP. The protocol can finish with the help of TTP. TTP can
get all information of the game and betting from C SC and
CSD . TTP can get the result of the game and forward the
payment to the winner.
The above protocol can be extended in a real application. In step 3, Client perhaps discloses part of his options
for the game to progress or prepare encrypted payment slips
for betting. In step 4, Dealer perhaps provides some information of the current game or prepare encrypted payment
slip to response Clients betting. In step 5, Client makes
his current options public. Payments are given if the Client
chooses to trust the Dealer. This kind of processes can repeat again and again until the end of the game or the Client
chooses not to trust the Dealer. The Dealer sends Client
GID , Client can run the game on his local machine to check
the whole process of gambling. If a cheating occurs, he can
bring all encrypted payment slips to TTP to prove that the
Dealer is cheating. The whole process is fair in this case.

4.2

Pure Luck Games

Many casino games are solely games of chance [11].
This kind of games can be abstracted as generating of a
random number. We assume that there are only two parties for the pure luck game. They will cooperate with each
other to generate the random number, during the process,
they will bet on the result of the random number. In this
part, we will discuss the fainess both of game process and
the dual-payment between two parties.
The following is the two-party protocol for generating a
random number and how they bet and arrange payment on
the output of the random number. We out-line the protocol
as:
1. Alice generates a random number and signs the hash
of the random number, Alice sends Bob:

M1 = H (RA ); < H (RA ) >ska; Pencr (P KT;
< RA >ska )
Pencr (P KT; < RA >ska ) is the TTP’s public key
encryption of the random number RA with the signature of Alice.

2. Bob generates a random number and signs the hash of
the random number, Bob sends Alice:

M2 = H (RB ); < M1 ; H (RB ) >skb;
Pencr (P KT; < RB >skb)
Pencr (P KT; < RB >skb) is the TTP’s public key
encryption of the random number RB with the signature of Bob.

3. Alice prepares her encrypted payment slip and the certificate of the encrypted payment slip

SA =< A; CA; B; M1; M2; Abetting; ta >ska
where A is Alice’s identification; CA is credit
information (defined in section 3.1) ; B is Bob
identification; M 1 and M2 are messages of step 1 and
step 2. Abetting contains Alice’s betting options and
amount of money for this betting. t a is timestamp.
Encrypted Payment slip is:

CSA = Pencr (P KT; SA )
With the technique of P EDLDLL, Alice counstructs
certificate of the encrypted payment slip CSACert.
Alice sends Bob

M3 = (ABetting; CSA ; CSA Cert )
4. Bob prepares his encrypted payment slip and the certificate of the encrypted payment slip

SB =< B; CB ; A; M3; Bbetting; tb >skb
where B is Bob’s identification; CB is credit information (defined in section 3.1) ; A is Alice’s
identification; M 3 is the message of last step.
Bbetting contains Bob’s response of Alice’s betting
which contains Bob’s amount of money on this
betting. tb is timestamp.
Encrypted Payment slip is:

CSB = Pencr (P KT; SB )
With the technique of PEDLDLL, Bob counstructs
certificate of the encrypted payment slip CSB Cert.
Bob sends Alice

M4 = Bbetting; CSB ; CSB Cert
5. Alice sends Bob the actual value of number RA :

M5 = RA ; < M4 ; RA >ska
6. Bob sends Alice the actual value of number RB :

M6 = RB ; < M5 ; RB >skb
7. Both Alice and Bob computes the random number

R = RA XOR RB
8. If Alice loses, Alice sends Bob her payment slip SA ; if
Bob loses, Bob sends Alice his payment slip SB .
In this protocol, Alice and Bob sends their hashes at first,
then they give their betting and prepare their payment slips.
They encrypt their payment slips with TTP’s public key and
construct certificates for verifying the encrypted payment
slips. They send their bettings, encrypted payment slips and
certificates for verifying their encrypted payment slips. In
this step, Alice and Bob have given their bettings with payments and can not change, but they can not get the money
at this time because payment slips are encrypted with TTP’s
public key. In step 5 and 6, they send their actual chosen
values to peer party, then both Alice and Bob can compute
the number.
The protocol is totally fair for both Alice and Bob. If the
loser refuses to pay, the winner could bring Encrypted payment slips both CSA and CSB to TTP. TTP can open them

and check the process of betting. TTP can then forward
payment slip to the winner. Alice can quit the protocol at
or before step 3, Bob can quit the protocol at or before step
4. At any other time, if one party stop the protocol, the peer
party can bring CSA and CSB to TTP, the protocol can continue the the end (the winner receives the payment) with the
help of TTP.

5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have exploited PEDLDLL techniques
to develop fair protocols for on-line gambling. We have
discussed the general fair-exchange protocol with credit
payment. Base on general fair-exchange protocol, we have
presented protocols for games from authority organization
and pure luck games which are useful in implementing
some real on-line games. Our protocols can guarantee the
fairness of both the games and payments. The major feature
of our protocols lies in the using of encrypted payment slips
and certificates of the encrypted payment slips. The credit
information is anonymous in our protocols. Our protocols
are only suitable for some of on-line games, there are many
open problems for the fairness of on-line gambling, for
example, if there are more than two people invloved in a
game, how to deal with the issue of collusion? How to
design fair protocol for different kinds of games such as
card games [12]? There are a lot of interesting issues to
study on on-line gambling.
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